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Bringing Financial Literacy 
to Washington
Peter R. Fisher
By focusing on “measuring and managing federal ﬁ  nancial risk,” you are 
asking the right questions about our ﬁ  nancial future. I hope you come up 
with some good answers soon. The broader question you address is this: can 
the Federal Government become ﬁ  nancially literate? Or, more importantly, 
can it learn to behave in a ﬁ  nancially literate manner?
Reasonable people may conclude that the best answer to this question is 
“No, it cannot: abandon all hope, ye who enter here.” That option is not 
open to me and I hope not to you. Those of us who would like to ensure 
that our national government’s ﬁ  nancial resources can be mobilized for our 
collective needs in the future must be concerned.
In particular, those of us who fear that we are on an unsustainable path 
of accumulating federal liabilities—current, contingent, and the future—
bear the burden of articulating a theory of the sustainable path of federal 
liabilities. We bear this burden because many of our fellow citizens think we 
are the shepherd boy crying wolf: the Federal Government appears to have 
no diﬃculty sustaining its liabilities.
Before I get going, let me come clean: I do not have a theory of the sustain-
able path of federal liabilities. I only have a few stories and a few suggestions.
My suggestions, in summary, are as follows:
1.  Do not wait for the bond market to help us out; that is not its job.
2.  We need to improve the process. This is not about a single set of true 
numbers but about more (and more useful) information.
Peter R. Fisher is Managing Director at BlackRock, Inc.
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3.  It is not just about process, it is about substance: this is a very real ﬁ  ght 
over the allocation of resources.
Now for the stories.
In the fall of 2001, as a newly conﬁ  rmed under secretary, my ﬁ  rst real 
assignment from the White House was to persuade Congress not to enact 
a loan guarantee program for the airline industry following 9/  11. My sec-
ond assignment was to help implement the loan guarantee program that 
Congress enacted.
Over the following months, I found myself awkwardly defending the 
federal ﬁ  sc from both on-   and oﬀ-  balance sheet attacks, including Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) “reform,” Pension Beneﬁ  t Guar-
antee Corporation (PBGC) “insolvency,” direct lending to absorb the cost 
of salmon spawning during a drought, expansion plans for student loan 
guarantees, terrorism risk insurance, and the decaying ﬁ  nances of the Postal 
Service. With each new topic I confronted, I tried to engage my counterparts 
in the language of ﬁ  nance, risk, and exposure but found myself treated as if 
I were speaking a foreign language completely unrecognizable to the indig-
enous population.
So, in response, I did what every under secretary learns to do when backed 
into a corner: I gave a speech, somewhere out of town. In it, I compared the 
Federal Government to “a gigantic insurance company (with a sideline busi-
ness in national defense and homeland security) which does its accounting 
on a cash basis—only counting premiums and payouts as they go in and 
out the door.” For good measure, I noted: “An insurance company with 
cash accounting is not really an insurance company at all. It is an accident 
waiting to happen.”
This was a clever thing to say. So clever, in fact, that a number of friends 
called to oﬀer me employment in anticipation of my dismissal.
While it may have been clever at the time, it is worth asking now, some 
years later, whether I still think it is an accurate or useful metaphor. Upon 
even more sober reﬂ  ection, I would say that in many ways I think it is—
although in one important way it is not.
First, an insurance company with only cash accounting would not be 
very good at pricing and managing the exposures it takes on, as it would 
have little information and insuﬃcient incentives to concern itself with risk 
and exposure.
Likewise, it is fair to say, I think, that the Federal Government is chal-
lenged when it comes to pricing risk. Usually, Congress intervenes, sets the 
price too low, and limits agency discretion to adjust price in response to 
risk—as the history of deposit insurance and pension beneﬁ  t guarantee 
premiums suggests.
More troublesome than the problem of Congressional handcuﬀs is the 
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Consider the Pension Beneﬁ  t Guarantee Corporation. For most of its his-
tory, it ran an accrual deﬁ  cit. Its business of insuring the pension obligations 
of corporate plans with underpriced premiums meant that it did not have 
suﬃcient reserves to absorb the losses of the pension plans that it was forced 
to take over. While some socialization of costs like these can be accepted in 
principle, in this case, Congress provided no mechanism to absorb the cost—
other than kicking it down the road. This is a bad business model.
Magically, in the late 1990s, the PBGC began to run surpluses that 
grew larger and larger as the economy (and stock market) strengthened. 
My friends and predecessors at the Treasury spent their time worrying not 
about PBGC solvency but rather about whether the PBGC’s assets should be 
invested in indexed equity funds or ones managed on a discretionary basis. 
When the stock market bubble burst and the economy turned in 2000 and 
2001, the PBGC’s ﬁ  nances decayed rather quickly.
It is a shame that during the “years of plenty,” more time was not spent 
thinking about the totality of the PBGC’s balance sheet.
The PBGC is thrice exposed to the equity market. Its primary business is 
not as a pension fund but rather as a corporate guarantee fund. In simple 
form, on the liability side of its balance sheet, the PBGC is guaranteeing 
the bottom quintile of Wilshire 5000’s pension fund’s investments in the 
Wilshire 5000. What is the appropriate equity position to hold on the asset 
side of such a balance sheet? It is short, not long.
No wonder the PBGC seemed to be on such solid footing during the 
go-  go 1990s. No wonder its ﬁ  nances deteriorated so quickly at the start of 
this decade.
The Federal Government is not a limited purpose organization; it has 
many objectives. But if it is going to take on the responsibility of interven-
ing in a highly complex market of investment and actuarial exposures, it 
is a shame that it cannot do so with its eyes open to the ﬁ  nancial risks and 
with the ability to structure its balance sheet accordingly. While it may be 
hard for some to imagine an instrumentality of the Federal Government 
shorting the American stock market, if our government is going to take on 
the responsibilities of an insurance company, doing so with one arm tied 
behind its back was bound to be expensive for taxpayers, pension plans, and 
retirees—as it has turned out in this case.
The second way the Federal Government is like a cash-  accounting insur-
ance company is that it is not in a position to understand and act upon 
knowledge of its aggregate position.
While progress has been made in bringing attention to the accrual position 
of major entitlement and beneﬁ  t programs, the major players in allocat-
ing federal resources—the Oﬃce of Management and Budget (OMB), the 
key Congressional committees, and the Congressional leadership—do not 
consciously act on the basis of accrual positions as either an objective or a 
constraint.16    Peter  R.  Fisher
Maybe a very thin silver lining to the prescription drug beneﬁ  t is that it 
was such a clear actuarial and accrual giveaway that Congress is less likely 
to sign up for such a whopper again any time soon. But I am probably 
being too optimistic. Let me come back to cash and accrual accounting in 
a moment.
There is an important way in which the Federal Government is not like 
an insurance company—namely in the apparent lack of market discipline. 
An insurance company incapable of pricing risk or acting upon knowledge 
of its net exposures would be punished by the capital markets and eventu-
ally ﬁ  nd it prohibitively expensive to borrow or to raise capital. The Federal 
Government, however, does not seem to be subject to this form of market 
discipline for its recent or its future deﬁ  cits.
That is right. It is not, and we should not expect it to be.
As we swung from annual surplus to annual deﬁ  cits in the early years 
of the Bush administration, interest rates magically fell. I remember doing 
one of those White House lawn interviews: squinting into the camera, I 
heard the interviewer in my ear ask me if I was having trouble borrowing all 
that money now that we had plunged into deﬁ  cits again. With interest rates 
approaching historic lows, I decided to take on something easier, and to 
the interviewer’s surprise, switched the subject to accounting for corporate 
stock options.
If we want useful information about the sustainable path of federal liabili-
ties, I do not think we are going to ﬁ  nd it in the bond market. This is because 
the term structure of yields on the least risky asset is principally determined 
by the expected path of monetary policy. That is why bond yields were fall-
ing as the deﬁ  cits expanded earlier in this decade, and that is why Japanese 
interest rates are still near historic lows, even as the Japanese government 
runs a ratio of deﬁ  cit to gross domestic product (GDP) that is roughly twice 
(as bad as) ours.
I say this not to suggest that we need not worry about the sustainable path 
of federal liabilities but rather to suggest that we need to worry even more. 
The bond market vigilantes are not going to help us, because they are not 
focused on our problem; they are focused on the Fed. If anyone wants to sit 
around and wait for the bond market to exert ﬁ  scal discipline without any 
assistance from monetary policy, then I really would recommend a ﬁ  eld trip 
to Japan.
In short, I have more conﬁ  dence in academia to address this problem than 
I do in the bond markets.
So, what is to be done? First, improve the process. I have three suggestions.
1.  Do not focus on one number or set of numbers; get more information.
A zero-  sum debate between cash and accrual accounting is not helpful. 
The answer is both. I would like to see more emphasis on accrual account-
ing, but I would not hide or do away with the cash budget. The scope of the Bringing Financial Literacy to Washington    1 7
Federal Government’s future contingent liabilities has reached the point 
where we need some constraints placed on accrued liabilities. While we may 
not be ready for an accrual budget, we need more accrual- based information 
for decision makers.
At BlackRock, our portfolio managers have a mind- boggling array of risk 
measures and credit information when making a decision to buy or sell a 
single bond or stock. Maybe we could get Congress to consider more than 
one set of numbers when they allocate national resources.
2.  Require “accrual accounting impact statements.”
Today, we have the cash budget and ten- year cash projections. I would like 
to see an additional requirement that prior to Congressional votes, there be 
an accrual accounting impact statement of any proposed legislation, scored 
by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) but consistent with the method-
ologies used in the Treasury’s Annual Financial Report.
Thirty years ago, environmental impact statements were in their infancy. 
They are subject to political interference and are imperfect. But we have 
learned a great deal over the last thirty years, and I think we are better oﬀ for 
having them. Looking back over the last three decades, I am conﬁ  dent that 
our nation’s ﬁ  nances would be better oﬀ if Congress had had to confront the 
accrual implications of their actions before they voted rather than after.
At the Treasury, we worked hard to get the Annual Financial Report 
completed in time to be released in December rather than March. We hoped 
that some day, Congress might take notice of the accrual positions before 
the start of the legislation season in January rather than when the horses 
were already out of the barn a few months later. It would be even better if 
individual bills had to be scored on their accrual implications.
Better enforced budget rules and pay-  go disciplines are important. How-
ever, inside any budget, there is more than enough latitude for a misalloca-
tion of resources. It is my experience that there is no substitute for killing 
bad ideas one at a time—if you can.
3.  We need more program-  speciﬁ  c risk and exposure information.
When the Airline Transportation Stabilization Board was set up, the 
net of the statutory and regulatory guidance we got was this: lend money 
where private markets fear to tread, but do not take unreasonable risks with 
the taxpayers’ money. Clearer guidance from Congress would have been 
helpful.
Eventually, we found our way, each board member using their own 
method. Options-  pricing methodologies helped us enormously. For my 
part, I reconciled our mandate with the thought that private bankers would 
demand a 90 to 95 percent probability of repayment. I decided to draw the 
line at ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  fty: I needed to believe that the taxpayer had a better than 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  fty chance of getting repaid. I thought this was pretty generous 
for the Treasury. But I was still thrown out of one senator’s oﬃce by the 18    Peter  R.  Fisher
senator himself—red in the face and screaming at me for all in the corridors 
to hear—for my lack of generosity.
Risk is deviation from objective. It matters whether the objective is to 
ensure the survival of the equity holders of all major airlines or only the 
survival of suﬃcient air transport capacity to meet likely demand. It mat-
ters whether the goal is to make student loans even more aﬀordable for all 
who want them or to make college education available for those who could 
not otherwise aﬀord it at all. However you may feel about these diﬀerent 
policy objectives, risk measures need to be designed with precision around 
speciﬁ  c program goals.
Congress wants to make murky compromises that placate as many mem-
bers as possible. When they create unworkable administrative complexity or 
take on absurd risks and exposures, the agency head can be paraded in front 
of the relevant committee and blamed for the entirely predictable problems. 
It would be funny if it were not costing us so much money and lowering the 
esteem in which the Federal Government is held by the American people.
The work that the academic community is doing to devise and improve 
upon the risk and exposure measures that can be applied to speciﬁ  c pro-
grams and contingent liabilities is of vital importance. These tools are simply 
not going to come from anywhere else.
But this not just about process, it is about substance. This is a vicious ﬁ  ght 
over the allocation of resources. Bringing greater ﬁ  scal discipline is about 
changing the outcomes. It is about shifting the allocation of resources away 
from some things and toward other things.
Let me oﬀer one example.
Our system of direct and indirect federal intervention in the housing mar-
ket, by providing guarantees of mortgage payments, does little or nothing in 
my view to make homeownership more aﬀordable. On the contrary, I think 
it makes homeownership less aﬀordable for the new home buyer.
If you lower the interest rate that is applied in ﬁ  nancing an asset, then 
the value of the asset goes up. If you raise the interest rate, the value 
goes down.
I have never been that interested in measuring the value of the subsidy 
provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, because I do not think that any 
of it ﬂ  ows to the net-  new home buyer. I think it ﬂ  ows to the asset holder—
the home seller. We are pumping up house prices, and it is hard to see how 
that makes it easier on ﬁ  rst-  time home buyers.
Our subsidy to mortgage ﬁ  nance simply means that we consume more 
housing than we otherwise would; more housing and less transportation; 
more housing and less energy eﬃciency; more housing and less education.
Rising levels of home ownership over the last ﬁ  fty years are more likely 
to be the consequence of productivity and rising standards of living than 
our interventions in mortgage ﬁ  nance. You may not agree me with about 
this. You may be able to persuade me that I do not see this correctly. But in Bringing Financial Literacy to Washington    1 9
the terms I have laid this out, we could actually have a ﬁ  nancially literate 
debate—and one with signiﬁ  cant implications for the allocation of resources 
in our society.
In conclusion, let me say again, thank you for bringing your intellects to 
bear on the problem of measuring and managing federal ﬁ  nancial risk.
I always told the staﬀ at the Treasury that they were expected to be the 
“straight men” of the Federal Government. In defending the federal ﬁ  sc, 
they had to play Stan Laurel while everyone else in Washington got to play 
Oliver Hardy.
Playing the straight man is hard work, and you need good material. Thank 
you for creating the material to be used by future under secretaries and 
future Treasury staﬀ in trying to bring a little more ﬁ  nancial literacy to 
Washington.